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ABSTRACT
This article takes an ethnographic look at the phenomenon of the
Anti-gang, a rather ambiguous everyday policing actor in the city
of Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu, which finds itself at
the very heart of the over two decades old protracted armed
conflict in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of
Congo. Like other everyday policing actors in Sub-Saharan Africa
and elsewhere, the Anti-gang of Goma defy simple categorization.
They are rather situated in-between categories: state/citizen,
public/private, formal/informal and crime fighters/criminals. They
are thus liminal subjects who embody the blurriness of these
supposedly binary categories’ boundaries. Sometimes they can be
framed as a vigilante organization; at other times, or indeed at the
same time, they can be depicted as a criminal youth gang, a
delegated municipal policing – or even a paramilitary – unit. The
aim of this article is, then, not to pin them down in one of these
categories, but to examine what kind of politics their everyday
practices produce. The main argument is that their in-between
position is what makes them politically significant, and at the
same time stuck in a liminal political space.
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The city of Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu, located at the border of Rwanda,
finds itself at the very heart of the protracted armed conflict ravaging the eastern provinces
of the Democratic Republic of Congo (hereafter the DRC) for over two decades now. In
contrast to other contributions in this volume, this article is not so much about war or
conflict dynamics, but focuses on the politics of everyday policing in the cités (popular
neighborhoods) of the city. As a growing body of empirically grounded literature suggests,
policing is not merely a state prerogative; it is performed by a plethora of actors.1 For the
case of Goma this is striking from the first moment one sets foot in the city. Besides the
large presence of Police National de Congo (PNC), Forces Armées de la République Démo-
cratique de Congo (FARDC, the Congolese Army) and the Agence National de Renseigne-
ments (ANR, the Congolese agency for intelligence) officers in the city, a variety of other
actors are engaged in policing such as UN-peacekeepers, private security company
employees, scouts arranging traffic, university brigades, street children looking after
parked cars and vigilante-type organizations. For the purpose of this article, I will focus
on one of these actors, the Anti-gang, a rather ambiguous “everyday policing actor.”2
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In short, these are gangs and sportifs (a term used in Goma and elsewhere in the DRC to
refer to people trained in martial arts) who transform themselves into Anti-gangs, claiming
to protect Goma’s inhabitants from the everyday violence and crime of themaibobo (street
children in Kiswahili) and other gangs. The word gang in Goma does not necessarily refer
to criminals, but rather – in both a positive and negative sense – denotes “toughness.” The
word gang is mostly used to refer to marginalized youth or the tough guys of the neigh-
borhood who smoke weed, drink strong liquor, and do not shy away from anything or
anyone in order to get what they want. The maibobo and gangs, however, do not enjoy
a good reputation in the city and are often blamed for much of the everyday crime and
violence in the city such as theft, robbery and extortion.
Groups of Anti-gang, each mostly around 10–20 young men, are organized around
what they call axes in the city. These axes are spatial demarcations of each group’s area
of intervention, centered around a commercial hotspot such as a market or gas station.
In return for their “protection,” the groups collections of 200–500FC (around 20–50 euro-
cents) per shop, parasol and ambulant vendor operating on their territory. Moreover,
Gomatriciens (inhabitants of Goma) can call on them when someone stole their belong-
ings such as a cell phone, or when they are threatened by maibobo or gangs in the neigh-
borhood. For a small fee, the Anti-gang will try to retrieve their phone, or deter the
maibobo or gang, which is causing trouble. Furthermore, they are at times solicited by pol-
itical figures such as the mayor or presidents of market committees, and by ANR, PNC or
FARDC officers. The Anti-gang can, for example, seek wanted persons, protect market
traders and customers from theft and provide muscle at order-making operations such
as public manifestations or eviction of pirate markets (non-licensed markets, often
along roadsides).
Building upon the literature on vigilantism, and Albrecht and Kyed’s Policing and the
Politics of order-making, this article examines everyday policing as a practice and a deeply
relational phenomenon. After all, akin to what Abrahams notes on vigilantism: “It is not so
much a thing in itself as a fundamentally relational phenomenon, which does not make
much sense except in connection with and often in contrast with others.”3 In other
words, the aim of this article is not to clarify whether or not the Anti-gang is to be
defined as a vigilante organization, a criminal youth gang or a delegated municipal poli-
cing unit. Rather, the case of the Anti-gang forces us to rethink supposed binary categories
such as state/society, formal/informal, and crime fighters/criminals. Through their prac-
tices, the Anti-gang take an in-between position, thus themselves embodying the blurriness
of these categories’ boundaries.
This article seeks to develop a deeper understanding of the politics produced by the
interplay of Anti-gang practices with those of other policing actors, in brief, to capture
the politics of everyday policing.4 Everyday policing is explicitly political in two ways.
Firstly, Anti-gang practices are embedded within larger power struggles in Goma’s
socio-political arena. They instrumentalize and are instrumentalized by other political
and policing actors. Secondly, as Kyed and Albrecht assert “policing can itself be pro-
ductive of new political spaces and subjectivities.”5 For the case of the Anti-gang, I
argue that their everyday policing practices produce a liminal political space and subjec-
tivity. Hereby I follow Bhabba’s understanding of liminality “as a transitory, in-between
state or space, which is characterized by indeterminacy, ambiguity, hybridity, potential
for subversion and change.”6
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The main argument of the article is that, by carving out a political space for themselves,
in-between the population, the gangs and the state, the Anti-gang become at the same time
politically significant and stuck in liminality – in a transitory space in-between gangs and
anti-gangs. Their transformation, I will argue, is never fully complete. The article is based
on 13 months of ethnographic fieldwork on anti-gangs and gangs in Goma, conducted
between 2015 and 2017. In order to protect the respondents, all the names of anti-
gangs have been anonymized.
The rise of a new policing actor in town
The Anti-gangwere founded in October 2007 at the principal market of Goma,Virunga, in
a period where the region experienced an upsurge of violence due to combats between the
FARDC and armed groups, namely the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda
(FDLR, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda), la Coalition des Patriotes
Résistants Congolais (PARECO, the Resisting Congolese Patriots), Mayi-Mayi militias
and the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP, the National Congress for
the Defence of the People) of Laurent Nkunda. Especially the latter rebellion had a pro-
found impact on Goma. Büscher argues that although the city was never taken by the
CNDP, Nkunda’s activities at its doorstep caused yet another influx of thousands of
IDP’s, and heightened tensions and urban crime levels.7 In those days, maibobo made
the law at the market of Virunga, extorting market traders and stealing from customers,
some interviewees remembered. The handful of PNC officers attached to the sub-police
station at the market were unable to get the situation under control and were blamed
for collaborating with the maibobo, sharing in their profit.8 Faustin, the president of the
market committee,9 exchanged ideas with the judo and karate Maître (master, title of
respect given to martial arts specialists) Robin, at the time a money exchanger at the
market, on how to deal with this situation. From these discussions, the Anti-gang were
born. Maître Robin recruited seven other sportifs, while Faustin sought the support of
the mayor and convinced the market traders to each make a weekly contribution of
200FC for the well-functioning of the Anti-gang.10
Polydore Wundi, Goma’s mayor at that time, backed the idea and handed the Anti-
gang service cards, which read: “auto-prise en charge [taking care of oneself: see below]
security guards.”11 Their members wore army boots and khaki uniforms, provided by
the president of the market committee who also controlled the income from the contri-
butions. On every corner of the market, one anti-gang12 stood guard. The other four
were patrolling inside and around the market. When they caught a maibobo red-
handed, they gave him a firm beating, and returned the stolen goods to the victim. After-
wards, they usually let the maibobo off.
The initiative was a success. Crime and theft on the market were said to have seriously
dropped during those days. Soon shops, restaurants, cafeterias and grocery stores around
the market started to solicit the services of the Anti-gang. They obliged and, in return,
passed by on a weekly basis to collect a voluntary contribution.13 These contributions
varied between 100FC14 and 10$ and were carefully registered on receipts.15
In August 2008 Roger Rachidi Tumbula took over the mayor’s office. This change of
power heralded a golden age for Maître Robin and his Anti-Gang. During this period, a
group of maibobo occupied a part of the forêt RVA, a green spot in Goma’s neighborhood
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of Himbi.16 Rumors that these maibobo were kidnapping people spread through the
radio.17 In response, Maître Robin launched what he referred to as Opération Athène.18
It was a jungle and the maibobo stole goats over there. There were even under-aged girls. We
recovered all these girls. It was an attack! We have burned all the shacks of those maibobo.
We have taken them all to the mairie (city hall). There were even journalists.19
The new mayor of the city congratulated the Anti-gang and on 3 October 2008, on request
of Maître Robin, he ofﬁcially authorized them to operate throughout the city:
Sir coordinator [Maître Robin], within the framework of the fight against the harassments
and extortions of all kinds suffered by my administered [unreadable word] by street children
commonly called maibobo. I have the honour to inform you that you are allowed to track
down all maibobo throughout the whole city of Goma. These operations shall be carried
out under supervision of the PNC/ville [PNC/city; i.e. police section attached to the city
hall]. To this end, I ask all officials of the specialised services in copy, each within their com-
petence, to provide assistance in case of need to ensure that themaibobo phenomenon is era-
dicated once and for all within my jurisdiction. […] Therefore, this remains a permanent
arrangement and is to be upheld under any circumstances [et ne peut souffrir d’aucune
faille]. You will regularly report to me.20
So, instead of reporting to the president of the Virunga market committee, the Anti-gang
now had to report regularly and directly to the mayor himself, and were ordered to work
under the supervision of the PNC/ville. In reality, however the police did not supervise the
Anti-gang. The transfer of culprits is a case in point. Although, on occasion, the Anti-gang
transferred thieves and robbers to a police cell, a more popular method was the so-called
Chapitre 7 (chapter 7). Referring to the seventh chapter of the UN Charter under which
the UN security council authorized MONUC (as the UN peacekeeping mission to the
DRC was called up to 2010) to use all means possible (hence including violence) to
fulﬁll its mandate to protect civilians. For the Anti-gang, however, the term “chapitre 7”
refers to a violent public punishment, during which they drag an apprehended thief
through the mud for everyone to see, and beat him21 up while avoiding serious injuries.
They would, for example, hit a robber with nunchakus – self-fabricated Japanese-style
martial arts weapons consisting of two iron sticks joined together by a chain – on his but-
tocks, so as not to break any bones. After this treatment, the thief is told to go and bathe in
Lake Kivu – a common washing place for many people in Goma – to cleanse himself and
wash away the bad spirits. The thief would usually be sent on this journey alone, not
watched over by the Anti-gang, because “[h]e has become harmless. He is so dirty that
nobody will approach him.”22 And, since a bucket of water will not do, the Anti-gang
were convinced that he would actually follow their instructions to rinse himself in the
lake. Moreover, on his walk of shame, people would then easily recognize the thief as a
thief, and understand that the Anti-gang are successfully at work.23
By the end of 2009 the Anti-gang were present at three axes in the city: Birere,24
Virunga and Katindo.25 Mayor Roger Tumbula called upon different traders’ associations
– such as the Federation of Congolese Enterprises26 and the Association of Food Dealers
and Vendors27 – to encourage their members to contribute 500FC per week to the Anti-
gang.28 The high demand made the members of the Anti-gang swell from eight, patrolling
the Virunga market, to thirty to forty persons operating throughout the city. To strengthen
discipline and cohesion amongst Anti-gang elements, internal regulations were set by
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Maître Robin. Those who were late or drunk on the job, or missed a sports training, had to
pay a fine. Accepting bribes from maibobo led to indefinite suspension.29
Besides standing guard at certain commercial hotspots in the city, the Anti-gang started
to carry out missions for the administrative municipal and even provincial authorities.
They started helping out themairie and communes30 – the administrative municipal auth-
ority underneath the city hall – in evicting pirate markets. In June 2010, instructed by the
Chef de Division Provinciale de la Justice et Garde des Sceaux31 (literally translated: the
Provincial Chief of the Justice Division and Keeper of Seals) – a high ranked provincial
state official – they oversaw the ban on ambulant vending of CDs and DVDs. Further-
more, that same year, they took an active part in the operation “Goma ville propre”
(Goma clean city), a personal prestige project of Mayor Roger Tumbula to demolish
what he referred to as “anarchistic constructions” on public space (mainly houses built
too close to the road). Here, they stood guard at demolition sites to prevent public
uproar. On occasion, Roger Tumbula invited the Anti-gang to accompany him on official
working visits instead of police officers attached to the city hall.32
The story of how the Anti-gang emerged as a new policing actor in town illustrates how
everyday policing is profoundly political and relational.33 Although it is said that the Anti-
gang emerged in reaction to complaints of an ineffective police force and rising petty crime
bymaibobo at the Virunga market, they do not simply fill a political and policing vacuum.
On the contrary: from their very foundation, the Anti-gang were articulated within, and
“form part of wider socio-political arenas.”34 From the start, they were instrumentalized
and co-opted by influential actors in the city: first and foremost by the mayor, but also
by the president of the market committee, the Chef de Division Provinciale de la Justice
et Garde des Sceaux, and officers of the PNC, FARDC and ANR.
Importantly, however, this is not a one-way, top-down process. The above-mentioned
operation Athène, during which the Anti-gang cleared the maibobo out of the fôret RVA,
which brought them to the attention of the city hall, is a clear example of how the Anti-
gang actively seek to insert themselves within patronage networks. I will discuss the impor-
tance of these practices below. But first, it is necessary to elaborate on what makes an
organization such as the Anti-gang so interesting for co-optation and instrumentalization?
On this matter, former Mayor Roger Tumbula asserted in an interview:
The Anti-gang are able to ensure security in the quartiers against the maibobo and they do
not weigh on the budget of the state. So, what harm is there in that? The police proved to
be ineffective. Moreover, they collaborate with the maibobo.35
Besides, he argued, the Anti-gang obey the orders of the mayor.36 Akin to what Kyed
argues for a community policing group in Swaziland, the Anti-gang are “not tied too
strictly.”37 Although the mayor has PNC, FARDC and ANR agents at his disposal, he
does not hold absolute authority over them. The latter are national security agencies
that, in the ﬁrst place, respond to their central hierarchies.38 When I asked an ANR
agent in the neighborhood of Kyeshero why he collaborated with the Anti-gang, when
he can also appeal to the PNC, he answered:
You see, the PNC here in Kyeshero – the quartier south from Ndosho – they are with six
police officers, six old men… . And they control from Terminus until CCLK. Count the
population between those two points. If you call upon the police, they are late. Moreover,
two police officers against Patient and Monstre [two Anti-gangs of Ndosho]. They [Patient
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and Monstre] kick them in the face and snatch their weapons. […] Police officers often come
from elsewhere. Say for example to a police officer who comes from Kisangani [a city west
from Goma, capital of Tshopo province]: go and arrest that man. Will he know him? But
they, the Anti-gang, they know already.39
Although one could easily read the critique of the ex-mayor Tumbula and the ANR agent
on the ineffectiveness of the police as yet another indication of state failure, a more careful
analysis, as Kirsch and Grätz assert, suggests that instrumentalization of “everyday poli-
cing actors” is above all to be seen as a “speciﬁc way of executing state power.”40 Or, as
Buur asserts for a similar case in South Africa’s Port Elizabeth, it is “a particular way of
incorporating segments of populations and territories, where the state never has been in
total control or particularly effective.”41 This is not only true for “the state,” that is state
actors. The same counts for other inﬂuential actors like the president of the market com-
mittee who co-founded the Anti-gang. In sum, by instrumentalizing the Anti-gang, inﬂu-
ential urban actors seek to boost their governance capacity and political authority within
Goma’s wider socio-political arena.
The case of the Anti-gang shows how everyday policing is a profoundly political affair.
They do not so much fill a political vacuum as engage in and form an integral part of the
larger political power struggle in the city. The next section will elaborate further on how
the Anti-gang claim this political space. In other words, how do they make themselves pol-
itically significant?
Becoming an Anti-gang subject
As mentioned above, co-optation is not a one-way, top-down process. From their side, the
Anti-gang actively seek to be inserted in – especially state – patronage networks. As will
become clear below, this is an important step for them to transform from gang into anti-
gang. But first, why become an anti-gang? Similar to the argument ofKyed argues, becoming
an anti-gang is a way for young marginalized and unemployed youth to become politically
significant, and to impose themselves as players in the wider process of order-making in the
city.42 They do so by carving out a political space for themselves “in-between” the state, the
populace and the world of gangs in Goma, deploying various performative and discursive
repertoires to legitimate their actions.43 The “in-between” political space they claim, I
argue, is a liminal space and is productive of a liminal political subjectivity.
In order to claim this space, the Anti-gang draw upon various citizen-, gang- and state-
like repertoires. Firstly, they emphasize that they are “citoyens qui se prennent en charge”
(citizens who fend for themselves). They are the Gomatriciens or watoto ya goma (children
of Goma) who have to protect the city, home to their friends and family members. The
discourse above comes from the widespread idea of auto-prise en charge that originates
from Mobutu’s economically declining Zaire in the 1980s, where people “were forced to
look after and organize themselves, taking over services previously provided by the
state.”44 Stressing that they are “children of Goma” is another powerful discourse, and
urban metropolitan variant on autochthony or “sons of the soil” – the “original” inhabi-
tants and “rightful owners who can ultimately decide how their territory is governed.”45
Although that in the urban context of Goma, many of its inhabitants originate from else-
where, people who grew up or lived in the city for a long enough time also identify with
being its “sons” or children in this sense.
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Secondly, they regularly emphasize that to be anAnti-gang, onemust also be a gang. One
cannot “protect” the inhabitants of Goma from gangs without being one oneself – it takes
one to catch or discipline one. As gangs or tough guys of the neighborhood, they know
every street corner. Furthermore, because they frequent the same ghettos (gathering
places to smoke weed and drink strong liquor), they are also familiar with all the other
gangs who hang out there. They are thus well informed of what is happening in Goma’s
gang world. This intricate street knowledge contrasts the Anti-gang from PNC and
FARDC officers who often come from elsewhere – something the Anti-gang is acutely
aware of and brags about. In sum, being a gang is what makes them effective as anti-gang.
Moreover, they are sportifs (trained in the martial arts) or, more precisely, sportif gangs.
For them, their bodies are weapons. Only lightly armed with nunchakus and trained in
Shotokan, boxing and/or judo, they are much more agile in catching maibobo and
thieves than police officers who carry heavy machine guns which they are sometimes
ordered to use to devastating effect.
Thirdly, although the Anti-gang mock the PNC, claiming to be more effective, or even
“define their raison d’être in opposition to ineffectual state-sanctioned policing,”46 they
deploy state-like repertoires. They look and act like the state, drawing upon what
Hansen and Stepputat have described as “languages of stateness.”47 They wear state-like
uniforms and army caps, interrogate suspects in Lingala (the language of the capital
and lingua franca of the PNC and FARDC) use a military-like terminology such as état
major for their headquarters, and mimic certain PNC practices such as removing footwear
of suspects, a common police practice to prevent the arrested from escaping in Goma’s
avenues paved with loose and sharp volcanic rocks. Moreover, they constantly seek to
(re)insert themselves into state networks and obtain official authorization letters from
state officials. The latter are then used while collecting money from shops and traders
in order to prove their authority and legality. Also, in case of conflicts with PNC or
FARDC officers, it is these authorization letters that often protect them from being
arrested. One day, for example, the commander of the police station in the neighborhood
of Ndosho asserted:
the Anti-gang charge a false tax of 200FC to the traders. […] One day we wanted to arrest
them, but then they showed us the authorisation of the mairie to do collections there. […]
The problem is our government […] we respect the law, but when there is a mission
order of the mairie, what do we do?48
So, while the Anti-gang are co-opted and instrumentalized by state ofﬁcials, the latter are
also instrumentalized by them.49 At other times, they operate on the direct orders of, or
directly collaborate with, state ofﬁcials. The eviction of pirate markets on behalf of the
municipal authorities is a case in point, a task usually carried out by the PNC. An
example of direct collaboration is their regular assistance to ANR or PNC ofﬁcers by
looking for and arresting (suspected) thieves or robbers. In short, as Buur asserts for a vig-
ilante organization in Port Elizabeth’s townships, the anti-gang “occupy a strategic pos-
ition between state institutions and local populations.”50 They ﬁt to what Lund has
called twilight institutions, “operating in the twilight between state and society, between
public and private.”51
Nonetheless, as illustrated above, the Anti-gang do more than deploying “languages of
stateness.” Similar to what Kyed and Albrecht argue for civilian policing groups, they
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“draw on hybrid repertoires of order-making and legitimacy in their everyday practices
and claims to authority.”52 They tactically navigate Goma’s socio-political arena by
mixing and shifting between repertoires53: state-like, gang-like, sportif-like and citizen-
like. They place themselves in-between and embody the blurriness of dichotomies such
as state/citizen, public/private, formal/informal, legality/illegality and crime fighters/
gangs.54 In doing so, the Anti-gang defy clear-cut categorization.55 While they may be
defined as a vigilante-type organization, at the same time they could be framed as a crim-
inal youth gang, delegated municipal policing – and even paramilitary-unit.
No single category can fully capture the Anti-gang. Rather, by claiming a transitory or
liminal space, they fit all of them in varying degrees. They sit in-between the state, the popu-
lace and the world of gangs and thus “do not hold clearly defined positions”56 but waver in-
between these worlds.57While they look and act like the state, collaborate with the state, and
(at times) are officially authorized by themayor, they are not a fully-fledged state institution.
While they transform from gangs into Anti-gangs, claiming to protect their fellow citizens
against themaibobo and gangs in the city, their transformation into legality is not fully com-
pleted: they still are and behave like gangs. The following quotes gathered from talking to
people in the neighborhood of Ndosho illustrate this ambiguous liminal character:
The Anti-gang, aah, they are also gangs. They smoke weed. They [gangs and anti-gangs]
know each other. They pretend to fight the maibobo, and afterwards they ask for money. I
give them 200FC almost every day. If you don’t pay, they can take your goods. They say
the money is for their maître. They are karateka. I never asked them their documents, but
they work for the city hall.58
The Anti-gang know very well where the maibobo hide, because they are former maibobo. It
is a vaccine against another vaccine, a microbe that kills another microbe. Anyway, we are
afraid of them because they fall under the same category as the maibobo. But the maibobo
run when they see the Anti-gang, so that is good. Often, they wear a kaki uniform of the
city hall, for visibility, to show that they are from the city hall.59
The Anti-gang ask 200FC from all the tradespeople next to the road. I trust them because of
the uniforms they wear, and I do not see as many maibobo as before. In case of theft, I do
appeal to them. Since they are here, theft has diminished.60
Despite their ambiguous character, by carving out this political in-between space, the Anti-
gang succeed in becoming a new everyday policing actor in town. It is through this process
of navigating through Goma’s socio-political arena that a new political (Anti-gang) sub-
jectivity is born: a liminal subjectivity shaped by their position between the populace,
Goma’s gang world and the state.
This subjectivity is a double-edged sword: they succeed in claiming this position only by
subjecting themselves to power. As Butler asserts: “the subject does not exist before it
enters into the relationship with an authority, but emerges by desiring to be addressed
by that authority and by attempting to master a skillful response.”61 The Anti-gang seek
to be addressed by authorities and insert themselves within patronage networks by
demonstrating that they master this in-between space. In other words: being gangs
trained in martial arts, “children of Goma” and good citizens qui se prend en charge,
while also speaking languages of stateness is what makes them effective and useful as
anti-gangs. In sum, it is exactly this liminal position what makes them politically
significant.
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Paradoxically, however, these very dynamics make the Anti-gang stuck in this transient
space. What happened after the emergence of the Anti-gang as a new policing actor in
town and their co-optation by Mayor Roger Tumbula illustrates this.
Stuck in-between
The collaboration between the Anti-gang and Mayor Tumbula did not go uncontested. It
became a thorn in the side of PNC officials in particular who started to consider the Anti-
gang as a direct competitor. These PNC officers, together with ANR officials and deputies
of the provincial assembly, accused Roger Tumbula of using the Anti-gang as a private
militia. A provincial deputy introduced a motion of information to the provincial assem-
bly where he argued that the Anti-gang took over the function of the PNC and thereby
undermined the state’s authority.62
Conflicts with the PNC started to arise. In June 2010, for example, two anti-gangs were
arrested by the PNC while – according to Maître Robin – intervening in a dispute during
which a woman had been beaten up by a group of maibobo. When the Anti-gang had
apprehended four of the alleged culprits and paraded them through the streets, they
were arrested by officers of the PNC/ville and charged with forming a militia, criminal
conspiracy and assault and battery. In a letter to the provincial director of the ANR,
Maître Robin asserted:
We ask the security council, the mayor of the city and the director of the ANR for protection,
because our lives are endangered by certain police authorities who intimidate us in many
ways and threaten to arrest us.63
In August 2011, Mayor Roger Tumbula was suspended for being complicit in two deaths
and many wounded during a forced eviction operation by FARDC soldiers of the market
of Mikeno (a neighborhood just next to the city center bordering Rwanda).64 His deputy,
Juvénal Ndabereye, became interim mayor.65 On the recommendation of the provincial
committee for security, Ndabereye withdrew the Anti-gang’s authorization to operate
within Goma66 on the grounds that it was a “structure not recognized by the state.”67
Since their suspension,Maître Robin has sought to regain the Mayor’s support and offi-
cial authorization. The new mayor, Jean Busanga Maliheseme, however, taking into
account the critique his predecessor had faced for sustaining a private militia, did not
want to collaborate with the “unrecognized association” of the Anti-gang. In response,
Maître Robin founded the not-for-profit association Virunga Protège Association (VPA,
Virunga Protection Association). This change of name occurred when the notary of the
city of Goma did not want to sign the statutes and internal regulations under the old
name of Anti-Gang Security Guard because the PNC had already adopted this name for
one of its units.68 However, the name of VPA is only used in formal correspondence
and bureaucracy, when drawing up contracts, for example, or sending official letters. In
the cités of Goma, they are still known and spoken of as the Anti-gang. Maître Robin
addressed multiple such letters requesting official reauthorization to Mayor Maliheseme
and his successor, Naasson Kubuya Ndoole (in common parlance often referred to as
Kundos), who took office in July 2012,69 but without success.
Without the support of themairie, it became difficult for the Anti-gang to operate in the
open. Some of the Anti-gang elements found a job as security guards at galleries and
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nightclubs on an individual basis. Others started to work as inspectors for ACCO (the
association of Congolese drivers) at public bus stations, maintaining order and ensuring
that every taxi bus contributes 200–300FC to the bombeurs, who attract customers to
the buses by shouting out their destination. Steve, who secures the public bus station of
Katindo II, asserted that
We are the mercenaries of Maître Robin, it is he who gives us orders. If he finds us a mission
order [signed by an authority], we are ready to work. He should show us documents of the
mairie that we are authorised to work.70
Nonetheless some of them kept on working in “camouﬂage” – as Thomas explained,
meaning covertly, on a more individual basis.
At the time of Kundos, we kept on working. It is not that we showed ourselves. But we, the
elements that passed every evening for collection, kept on passing by frequently. But Kundos
did not know that the elements were there. So, we camouflaged ourselves. Would you go to
bed hungry, while our mamas are there? I went on the field and looked for a little something
for myself from the mamas that knew me. I said: mama really, we have no other option (pas
de moyen), even if they stopped the movement, we are still there for you, for the population.
Can you give me a little something? Somebody with a good heart, who has money, would give
me something. Even a sende (500FC), if you multiply that by the number of boutiques… I go
home with my ration. We worked… 71
When, in August 2015, Dieudonné Malere was appointed Mayor of the city, things started
to look brighter again for the Anti-gang. Especially Luanda, the mayor’s son, took a
renewed interest in the Anti-gang and presented himself as their coordinator, intending
to “formalise the Anti-gang as a private institute that works with the state, or maybe
even a state institution.”72 In November 2015, a reunion was organized between the secur-
ity council of the city hall and the Anti-gang. It decided to change the badly-reputed name
of the Anti-gang and start an identiﬁcation process of all anti-gangs in the city. Feeling
supported by the new mayor, before and after the meeting, the Anti-gang restructured
and visibly started to expand their activities. A new group of anti-gangs in the neighbor-
hood of Ndosho were recruited, which patrolled the city’s main roads in khaki uniforms.
In Ndosho, this renewed enthusiasm was very palpable. In November 2015, for
example, seven anti-gangs, dressed up in brown uniforms, military caps and armed
with nunchakus, were enthusiastically parading three alleged armed robbers through
the streets of the neighborhood. They were forced to walk bare-feet and carry car tires
around their necks (in mob justice incidents, car tires are often used to burn caught
thieves alive). On the road, a patrol of FARDC soldiers asked the anti-gangs to hand
over the alleged criminals to them. The leader of the group refused, arguing that the
mairie was already informed that they were on their way. The soldiers then merely
made sure that the anti-gangs removed the car tires from the alledged thieves’ necks
and continued on their way.73 Besides catching thieves and transferring them to the
police station, the Anti-gang picked up other of their old activities such as evicting
pirate markets on behalf of the mairie.
Their euphoria did not last long. On 31 December 2015, all but two of the Anti-gang of
the Ndosho axis were arrested on command of the provincial head of the PNC, General
Awashango. Earlier that day, when driving though, the general had spotted Maître
Robin and a group of Anti-gang elements from the Katindo and Virunga axis brutally
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disciplining a fellow Anti-gang with nunchakus in public, who had been denounced for
stealing a cell phone. When the general and eight police officers approached the crowd,
Maître Robin and his elements fled. While fleeing, one of the Anti-gang kicked a police
officer. In response, the general called for backup and ordered to arrest all Anti-gangs
in the city on the grounds of being an association of criminals. Consequently, the Anti-
gang of the Ndosho, that were unaware of the event, were rounded up. Six of them
ended up in Goma’s central prison of while others went into hiding and kept a low
profile. In February 2016, the last two Anti-gangs of the axe Ndosho were able to pay
themselves out of prison. The Anti-gang’s Ndosho axe, however, disintegrated for the
time being. Most of them became gangs and photographers again, street slang for
thieves (as stealing is like taking a picture: in a flash, your money or cell phone is
gone). While before 31 December, the Anti-gang performed collections from shopkeepers
and parasol vendors collectively on the main roads, showing off their khaki uniforms, now
collections were held more covertly, “in camouflage,” on a more individual basis, and away
from the main roads. Also, the Anti-gangs in the other neighborhoods under the control of
Maître Robin, now only provided – in his words – a “minimal service,” that is, only col-
lecting money.74
This episode shows that the political space that the Anti-gang carve out for themselves
is precarious.75 Soon after their emergence and co-optation by Roger Tumbula – similar to
what has been described for cases of vigilante-type organizations76 – conflicts started to
arise with other state actors, especially with certain PNC officials. In an interview with
the provincial PNC General Awashango, after he had given the order to arrest all Anti-
gangs in the city, he argued:
It is not their job, even when they collaborate with themairie. Also, the universities have their
brigades to discipline the students and can provide us with information in security matters.
But they [referring to the Anti-gang] cannot do what the state does.77
This also shows that the state apparatus is not one homogeneous entity. Government insti-
tutions, and departments, networks and ofﬁcials within these institutions, are involved in a
constant struggle for authority between themselves and other actors. As mentioned in the
ﬁrst section, the Anti-gang form an integral part of the larger power struggle in Goma’s
socio-political arena. While, to different extents, the Anti-gang succeed in making alliances
with the mayor and other political and policing actors, they contest and ﬁght with others.
Moreover, as we have seen, alliances are not stable. In order to survive, the Anti-gang need
to cautiously navigate and negotiate their way through a very complex urban policing and
authority landscape. Or, as Kyed and Albrecht assert,
policing actors operate within a wider political arena of overlapping jurisdictions and com-
peting claims to authority, not within one fixed socio-legal order or amongst peacefully coex-
isting systems of policing.78
This means that a central feature of policing, and broader politics, is boundary work.79 In
negotiations, contestations and collaborations with the Anti-gang, other policing and pol-
itical actors play with the former’s liminal position in-between the populace, the state and
the world of gangs. As shown above, they do so by withdrawing the Anti-gang’s ofﬁcial
(state) authorization on the grounds that they are a “structure not recognized by the
state”80; by accusing them of criminal conspiracy and being a “private” militia; or by
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formalizing them as a private institute working with the state, or in, Luanda’s words, “even
a state institution.”81 So, the liminal position the Anti-gang occupy makes them both pol-
itically signiﬁcant and vulnerable. When framed as “not recognized by the state,” or even a
criminal association, they transform back from Anti-gangs into mere gangs, operating in
camouﬂage, working as mercenaries in Goma’s informal security sector while waiting for
(new) authorization documents. This explains the importance and constant efforts of the
Anti-gang to insert themselves into patronage networks. InMaître Robin’s words, after the
reunion with Mayor Maliheseme in November 2015: “The mayor said they cannot pay us
or give us a salary. But they can support us. Support82 is money, no?.”83 However, within
the larger struggle for power within Goma’s political arena, the backing, support and ofﬁ-
cial authorization by the mayor is not sufﬁcient. Other actors need to be considered, too.
So, while the Anti-gang sometimes succeed in claiming a political space for themselves in-
between worlds, at the same time they remain stuck in this liminal zone.84
Conclusion
The case of the Anti-gang in Goma shows that everyday policing is a profoundly political
phenomenon. As illustrated above, the everyday practices of the Anti-gang form an inte-
gral part of wider power struggles in Goma’s socio-political arena. They make themselves
politically significant by claiming a political space in-between the populace, the world of
gangs and the state. To legitimate their actions, they deploy various discursive and perfor-
mative repertoires of all three of these worlds: they draw upon the discourse of auto-prise
en charge (taking care of oneself) and being Gomatracien, they speak languages of state-
ness, and perform toughness (they are gangs) by smoking weed, drinking strong liquor
and practicing martial arts. It is precisely their in-between position that makes them
targets of instrumentalization and co-optation by influential political and policing
actors who seek to boost their governance capacity and authority. From these Anti-gang
practices and by subjecting themselves to influential political actors, a new liminal political
(Anti-gang) subjectivity is produced.
Nonetheless, the Anti-gang do not succeed in consolidating this in-between political
space they carve out for themselves. Conflicts arise with other influential actors, and
power relations within Goma’s socio-political arena make alliances with patrons wax
and wane. Akin to what Kyed argues for community policing, the political space the
Anti-gang carve out for themselves “is a transient one. It is only really valuable if it
takes you somewhere else, somewhere more certain.”85 Their very in-between position
that makes them politically significant also makes them stuck in liminality and expend-
able.86 In the wider urban struggle for authority, they are vulnerable to being framed as
a private militia, criminal association or a “structure not recognized by the state.” At
these times, it becomes difficult for them to operate and they are forced to camouflage
themselves. In sum, the same dynamics that make them politically significant make
them waver in a transient political space in-between gang and anti-gang.
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